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We investigate indeterminism in physical observations. For this, we introduce a distinction be-
tween genuinely indeterministic (creation-1 and discovery-1 ) observational processes, and fully de-
terministic (creation-2 and discovery-2 ) observational processes, which we analyze by drawing a
parallel between the localization properties of microscopic entities, like electrons, and the lateral-
ization properties of macroscopic entities, like simple elastic bands. We show that by removing the
randomness incorporated in certain of our observational processes, acquiring over them a better
control, we also alter these processes in such a radical way that in the end they do not correspond
anymore to the observation of the same property. We thus conclude that a certain amount of inde-
terminism must be accepted and welcomed in our physical observations, as we cannot get rid of it
without also diminishing our discriminative power. We also provide in our analysis some elements of
clarification regarding the non-spatial nature of microscopic entities, which we illustrate by using an
analogy with the process of objectification of human concepts. Finally, the important notion of rela-
tional properties is properly defined, and the role played by indeterminism in their characterization
clarified.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to so-called creation-discovery view of reality [1, 2], our observations (also to be understood as measure-
ments, tests, experiments, experiences, etc.) always involve a double aspect: an aspect of discovery, through which
we obtain information about what is already present in the system under consideration, prior to our observation,
and an aspect of creation, through which we literally create (or destroy) what is being observed, by means of the
observational process itself.
When the first aspect predominates, we are typically in a classical, deterministic, regime, and when the second
aspect predominates, we are typically in a quantum, indeterministic, regime. On the other hand, when both aspects
are simultaneously present, we are in a mixed, intermediary regime, neither purely classical nor purely quantum, but
quantum-like, which cannot be described by phase space or Hilbert space structures.
Within the general conceptual framework of creation-discovery view, a more definite approach, called hidden-
measurement approach [2, 3], has also been introduced, to address the more specific issue of quantum measurement
and the origin of non-Kolmogorovian quantum probabilities. According to this approach, when an experimenter
observes a given property of a quantum entity, like, say, the position of an electron (by means of a suitable measuring
apparatus), the process can be described as a mechanism of selection of a specific deterministic interaction, amongst a
collection of possible ones. And since this selection occurs in a way which is beyond the possibility of practical control
by the experimenter, the outcome of the observational process cannot be known in advance, but only described in
probabilistic terms.
One can show that this very natural hidden-measurement mechanism (which has been explicitely incorporated
in a number of macroscopic machine-models [1, 2, 4–7], able to imitate the behavior of microscopic entities) is a
possible key ingredient for the explanation of the non-classical structure of the quantum probability calculus. And in
that sense, it certainly represents one of today’s best candidates for a realistic solution of the longstanding, and still
controversial, measurement problem in quantum mechanics.
An interesting consequence of the hidden-measurement approach is that since quantum probabilities would also be
related to a situation of lack of knowledge (not about the state of the system, but about the specific interaction which
is selected during a measurement), similarly to classical probabilities their nature would be epistemic, and not ontic.
Also, considering that, without losing generality, each individual hidden interaction can be taken to be a deterministic
process, quantum probabilities, and therefore quantum mechanics, wouldn’t in principle be incompatible with the
view of a completely deterministic world as a whole.
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze some further these questions and ideas, and show that even though,
in accordance with Aerts’ hidden-measurement approach, one can certainly defend that quantum probabilities are
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2epistemic, as they are describable in terms of the experimenter’s lack of knowledge about the specific deterministic
hidden interaction which is actually selected, nevertheless one cannot conclude that such a situation is compatible
with the view of a radical determinism. The reason for this is that, as we will see, the lack of knowledge subtended by
quantum probabilities is in fact ineliminable, and therefore, despite their epistemic character, non-classical systems
are nonetheless to be considered as genuinely indeterministic.
To reach this conclusion, we start by recalling, in Section II, a certain number of basic physical concepts. In doing
so, we also introduce the important conceptual distinction between creation-1 and creation-2 observational processes
(as well as between discovery-1 and discovery-2 processes), which as far as we know has not been clearly made in
the literature. In Section III, we exemplify these notions on a very simple macroscopic physical entity – an ordinary
elastic band, – by defining and analyzing what we have called the left-handedness property.
Then, in Section IV, we show that the indeterminism which is inherent in the observation of the left-handedness
of an elastic band, due to the observer’s lack of control over the experimental procedure, cannot be eliminated, and
thus represents a genuine form of indeterminism. In Section V, we use the analysis of the left-handedness’ property
of the elastic bands to draw a parallel with the localization property of microscopic entities, like electrons, thanks to
which we clarify the genuinely non-spatial nature of microscopic entities.
In Section VI, we provide an additional illustration of the fundamental difference between creation-1 and creation-2
observations, by considering the process of objectification (and therefore spatialization) of an abstract concept into
a concrete object, operated by a human mind. In Section VII, we explain in which sense indeterminism has to be
preserved in certain of our observations, not to reduce our discriminative power, and in Section VIII we analyze
how indeterminism is linked to the relational character of typical quantum or quantum-like properties. Finally, in
Section IX, we offer a concluding comment.
II. CREATION AND DISCOVERY
Let us start by recalling what a property is. Generally speaking, it is “something” a physical entity is able to
possess, independently of the type of context it is confronted with. Properties can either be actual or potential. If
they are actual, it means that the successful outcome of the observational processes which are used to define them,
can always be predicted in advance, with certainty, at least in principle. On the other hand, if they are potential, it
means that such successful outcome cannot be predicted in advance with certainty, not even in principle.
When we say that an entity has a given property, what we generally mean is that the entity possesses it in actual
terms. Thus, if the property is potential in a given moment, it simply means it is not possessed by the entity in that
moment. However, a potential property is not an impossible property. Indeed, the notion of potentiality expresses
the fact that although an entity may not possess a given property in a given instant, it may nevertheless possess it
in a subsequent instant, at least in principle. In other words, a property is potential for a given entity if the entity is
available in possibly actualizing it, in specific circumstances.
Observations, as understood in the present paper, are processes that can be used to operationally define the prop-
erties we associate to the various physical entities [13]. They are also called experimental projects, tests, experimental
questions, measurements, etc., and correspond to practical procedures whose outcomes lead to well-defined “yes-no”
alternatives. [8–11] A properly defined observation requires the specification of a measuring apparatus to be used, the
actions to be performed, and the rule to be applied to unambiguously interpret the results of the process in terms of
the (mutually excluding) “yes” (the observation is successful) and “no” (the observation is unsuccessful) alternatives.
Generally speaking, for a given property there is a number of different observational processes one can use to
equivalently define and observe the property in question. More precisely, two observational processes are said to be
equivalent if, whenever we are in a position to predict in advance the outcome of one of them, we can also predict
the outcome of the other, and vice versa. Therefore, in general terms a property is not defined by means of a single
observational process, but of an entire equivalence class of observational processes. In fact, mathematically speaking,
one usually identifies a property with the equivalence class of its observational processes. [8–11]
When all the actual properties of an entity are known, then also its state is known, as in general terms the state
of an entity corresponds to the set of all its actual properties, i.e., to the collection of all properties that are actual
for the entity in a given moment. Of course, since with time some actual properties become potential, whereas some
other potential properties become actual, this means that the state of an entity, in general, changes (i.e., evolves) as
time passes by. However, not all properties of an entity necessarily change with time: some of them, usually called
intrinsic properties, or attributes, are more stable, and are typically used to characterize the entity’s specific identity.
Considering that the state of an entity is, by definition, the collection of all properties that are actual for that
entity in a given moment, it’s clear that once we fully know its state, we also know all it can be said with certainty, in
that moment, about the entity. This may erroneously lead one to believe that, accordingly, the outcome of whatever
observation we can perform on the entity is in principle predictable with certainty. This belief is usually referred to
3as the classical prejudice, and it has been put seriously into question by the advent of quantum mechanics [8–10].
However, as we will show in the present paper, one can conclude about the groundlessness of the classical prejudice in
more general terms, independently of the specificities of the quantum formalism, and of its possible interpretations.
If the outcome of an observation associated to a given property is always predictable in advance with certainty,
regardless of the state in which the entity is, then the property is called classical, in relation to that entity. A same
property can however be classical for an entity, but non-classical for another entity. For example, being localized in
a given region of space is a classical property for a macroscopic entity, but a non-classical (quantum) property for a
microscopic entity, like an electron.
Conversely, if there are states of an entity such that the outcome of an observation is not predictable with certainty
in advance, not even in principle, then the property associated to that observation is called non-classical, in relation
to that entity. Quantum properties are of course a typical example of non-classical properties, but not all non-classical
properties are necessarily of the quantum kind (i.e., describable by a projection operator acting on a Hilbert space).
Based on the above definition of a classical property, one could be tempted to define a “classical entity” as an entity
whose properties would be all classical. However, strictly speaking, classical entities do not exist. Indeed, it is always
possible to submit a hypothetical classical entity to an observational process defined in such a way that its outcome
will not be predictable in advance, so that the property associated to that observation would be, by definition, a
non-classical property of the entity, thus contradicting its presumed classicality. This means that an entity can be
considered classical only provided we restrict our observations to a limited subset of classical properties. (See [17] for
a more elaborated discussion about the influence of experimental contexts in the characterization of the classicality
of an entity).
Seemingly, one may be tempted to define a pure “non-classical entity” as an entity whose properties are all non-
classical. But again, strictly speaking, pure non-classical entities do not exist, as to give a proper meaning to the very
notion of an entity one needs to attribute to it, as a minimum, the property of its existence, which by definition is a
classical property (at least for the entire duration of existence of the entity). Also, one needs to attach to the entity a
given number of attributes, to characterize its distinctive identity, and attributes are by definition classical properties.
As we said, observations can either be of the discovery kind or of the creation kind. A discovery is a non-
invasive observational process, which doesn’t alter the state of the entity under examination. A creation (in the sense
understood in this paper) is an invasive observational process producing a change in the state of the system under
examination. In this work we will only consider soft creations, i.e., structure preserving processes that do not alter
the set of states of the entity. More invasive processes, called hard creations, which are able to alter the set of states
of an entity and go as far as to destroy its original identity, can also be considered, but we will not need to do so in
the present analysis [12].
Observations of the creation kind can be divided into two fundamental categories, which are the following:
Definition 1 [creation-1 and creation-2 observations]. A creation-1 is an invasive observational process whose effects
on the observed entity (i.e., the outcomes of the observation) cannot in general (i.e., for all entity’s states) be predicted
in advance, not even in principle. On the other hand, a creation-2 is an invasive observational process whose effects
are always predictable in advance, with certainty, at least in principle.
Similarly, also observations of the discovery kind can be divided into two fundamental categories:
Definition 2 [discovery-1 and discovery-2 observations]. A discovery-1 is a non-invasive observational process whose
outcomes cannot in general (i.e., for all entity’s states) be predicted in advance, not even in principle. On the other
hand, a discovery-2 is a non-invasive observational process whose outcomes are always predictable in advance, with
certainty, at least in principle.
Considering the above definitions, we are now in a position to propose a slightly more specific characterization of
the notion of classical property, which is the following:
Definition 3 [classical and non-classical properties]. A property is classical (in relation to a given entity) if and
only if all the equivalent observational processes which operationally define it, are either of the discovery-2 or of the
creation-2 kind. On the other hand, a property is non-classical if and only if all the equivalent observational processes
which operationally define it are of the discovery-1 or creation-1 kind.
As we already remarked, two observational processes are said to be equivalent if and only if, when we are in a
position to predict in advance the outcome of one of them, we can also predict the outcome of the other, and vice
versa. However, since by definition creation-1 and discovery-1 observational processes are unpredictable, one cannot
use such a criterion to provide a general characterization also of equivalent creation-1, or discovery-1, observational
processes. Therefore, we propose to characterize in more general terms the equivalency of two observational processes
as follows:
4Definition 4 [equivalent observations]. Two observational processes are equivalent (in relation to a given entity)
if and only if they are characterized by exactly the same possible outcomes and (1) in case these outcomes would
be predictable in advance, the predictions for both observations always coincide, for all entity’s states (deterministic
equivalence), or (2) in case these outcomes wouldn’t be predictable in advance, not even in principle, the outcomes’
statistics for both observations coincide, for all entity’s states (indeterministic equivalence).
From such a definition, it immediately follows that creation-1 and creation-2 observational processes (or discovery-1
and discovery-2 observational processes) can never correspond to equivalent observations, and therefore be used to
define the same physical property, even though they are characterized by the same outcomes. And this also means
that one cannot transform a creation-1 observation into a creation-2 observation (or a discovery-1 observation into a
discovery-2 observation) without irremediably affecting the very property which is being observed. It is one of the
purposes of the present essay to make this fact as explicit and evident as possible, through the analysis of a simple
macroscopic example.
III. QUANTUM ELASTIC BANDS
In this section we will exemplify some of the notions we have introduced in the previous section by studying a
very simple physical entity: a (uniform) elastic band. Our definition of an elastic band includes the possibility for the
elastic to be also broken in multiple fragments. In other terms, any process producing the breaking of the elastic will
not be considered as a process that destroys the elastic’s identity, but just as a process that changes its state.
It is easy to associate to an elastic band a number of classical properties. As an example, consider the property
L10 of “having an unstreched length greater than 10 centimeters.” A possible observational process associated to this
property is the following: “Take a measuring tape, measure the respective lengths of all the elastic fragments, taking
care every time to replace them in the exact position they were before the measurement, then add up all the obtained
lengths, and if the result is greater than 10 centimeters the observation of the property is successful (outcome ‘yes’);
in the opposite case, the observation is unsuccessful (outcome ‘no’).”
It is of course easy to find other observational processes that can be used to equivalently define such property. For
instance, one can utilize a camera and take a picture of the elastic’s fragments, placing next to them a reference object,
whose length is known, then use the picture to calculate the overall elastic’s length. This test is clearly equivalent to
the previous one, as it yields exactly the same outcomes. Of course, given an arbitrary elastic band entity, if we fully
know its state (which also includes a specification of its unstreched length), we can predict in advance, with certainty,
the result of the two above mentioned observational tests, which is the reason why L10 is (according to our defintion)
a classical property. Let us also observe that the equivalent measuring procedures associated to L10 are perfectly
non-invasive for the elastic-entity, so that they correspond to discovery-2 processes.
In a similar way, one can easily define and associate other properties to elastic band entities, by means of (non-
invasive) observational processes of the discovery-2 kind, like for instance the property of “having a volume greater
than 0.5 cubic centimeters,” of “being made of exactly 3 separate fragments,” etc. But, as we have emphasized in the
previous section, a classical property can also be defined in terms of a creation-2 process. Let us consider for instance
the property of cuttability, which is so defined: “Count the number N of fragments forming the elastic band, then take
the longest one and cut it in two halves with a scissor, then count again the number M of fragments of the elastic.
If M = N + 1, the observation of the cuttability property is successful (outcome ‘yes’); otherwise, the observation is
unsuccessful and the outcome is the ‘no’ answer.”
Let us highlight a subtle point: the creation-2 observational process associated to the cuttability property is not a
process through which the cuttability property is created. It is a process through which the property is simply made
manifest. Indeed, the cuttability property was already possessed, in actual terms, by the elastic band entity before
its practical observation, as is clear that one could predict with certainty the outcome “yes” of the observation before
executing it. However, if we execute in practical terms the observation, the process is necessarily invasive, in the sense
that it changes the state of the system, here by increasing the number of fragments of the elastic. So, during the
observation there is the creation of a new state, although not the creation of the observed property.
This means that, technically speaking, a creation-2 process is in fact also a discovery process, although of an invasive
kind, as it consists in the observation of how a system predictably reacts, by changing its state, when it is acted upon
in a specific way.[27] Let us also notice that the classical character of the cuttability property is related to the fact
that its observational process, although invasive, is under the full control of the observer, and this is the reason why
the outcome is predetermined (i.e., predictable in advance with certainty) and the property classical. Does this mean
that an elastic band is a classical entity? As we explained in the previous section, we can only say so if we restrict our
observations to a subset of classical properties, as it is also possible to associate non-classical properties to conventional
object-entities, like an elastic band. These non-classical properties are defined in terms of creation-1 and discovery-1
5observational processes. Let us consider an example of a property defined by means of a creation-1 process, which we
will call left-handedness (examples of a discovery-1 observational processes will be given in Sections IV C and VIII).
To know what the left-handedness of an elastic band is, all we need to do is to explain how we have to proceed to
unambiguously observe it, in practical terms. The observational procedure is the following:
Definition 5 [left-handedness of an elastic band]: Grab the two ends of the longest fragment of the elastic, with both
hands, then stretch it strongly and abruptly, so it breaks. If the longest fragment remains in your left hand, the
left-handedness has been successfully observed (outcome “yes”); otherwise, the observation has been unsuccessful and
the outcome is “no” (see Fig. 1).
FIG. 1: A succesful observation of the left-handedness of an elastic band.
The observation of the left-handedness of an elastic band is a typical example of a process during which a specific
interaction is selected among a number of possible ones, in a non predictable way, in accordance with Aerts’ hidden-
measurement description. Indeed, when the observer stretches abruptly the elastic band, s/he has no ways whatsoever
to control the final effect of its action, i.e., the point x at which the elastic will eventually break, thus producing either
the “yes” or the “no” outcome.
One can describe this process by saying that to every possible breaking point x, it corresponds a specific interaction
Ix (in fact, an entire class [Ix] of equivalent interactions) between the measuring apparatus constituted by the two
hands of the observer and the system constituted by the elastic band entity. Because of the presence of a number of
fluctuating factors, such as the imperceptible oscillations of the hands, the variable pressure exerted by the fingers,
the effective rapidity with which the elastic is abruptly stretched, and so on, it is truly impossible for the experimenter
to control which exact interaction Ix will be actually selected, among the countless a priori possible ones, and thus
know in advance the point x at which the elastic will finally break (let us recall that the human observer must stretch
the elastic strongly and abruptly, to comply with the observational procedure).
Before the execution of the observational experiment, all the breaking points are a priori possible: they are all
potential breaking points. But when the elastic is grasped and stretched, a symmetry breaking process occurs, in the
sense that a specific interaction Ix is unconsciously selected by the observer, causing the rupture of the elastic in a
specific point x. Accordingly, the property of the left-handedness, which was only potential prior to the experiment,
will be either actualized or not, i.e., its observation will be either successful or not.
Let us observe that although the outcome of the left-handedness observation is unpredictable in advance, the
observer can nevertheless calculate a probability for it. The observational procedure being perfectly symmetric with
respect to the left and right hands of the experimenter, the probability to observe the left-handedness is obviously
equal to 0.5 (a fact which can be confirmed by performing a sufficient number of observations on identical elastic
6bands). This probability, however, doesn’t result from a lack of knowledge concerning the state of the observed entity
(as it is assumed in certain hidden variables theories), but about the interaction which effectively takes place between
the observer’s measuring apparatus (her/his hands) and the observed entity.
In other terms, we must distinguish two different categories of lack of knowledge, producing different probability
calculus. Classical probabilities, obeying Kolmogorov’s axioms, correspond to situations where the lack of knowledge
is only about the state of the entity, whereas non-classical probabilities, not obeying Kolmogorov’s axioms, correspond
to situations where there can be perfect knowledge about the state of the entity, but lack of knowledge about the
interaction which is actually selected during the observation (i.e., during the measurement). Quantum probabilities
appear then to be a special case of non-classical probabilities, corresponding to the limit situation where the lack of
knowledge about the interaction is maximal [1–4].
Here we would like to point out three important features of the left-handedness observation, which we believe are
also typical of a quantum measurement [13]: (1) the presence of a random selection mechanism; (2) the irreducible
invasiveness of the observational process; and (3) the ephemerality of the observed property, due to its relational
character.
The random selection mechanism is the one which picks, in an unpredictable way, a specific interaction Ix, the
unpredictability being caused by the fluctuations which are built-in in the very observational procedure. In formal
terms, such a random selection mechanism is described in the Geneva-Brussel formalism by the notion of product test
(or product observation, to use the terminology introduced in [13]), originally formulated by Constantin Piron [8–10].
More will be said about product observations in the following.
The irreducible invasiveness consists in the fact that the very observational procedure contemplates the action of
breaking the longest elastic fragment into two halves, thus inevitably changing the elastic’s state. Such a disturbance
cannot be avoided, as the breaking action is encoded in the very operational definition of the left-handedness property.
Finally, the left-handedness property is clearly ephemeral. Indeed, imagine you have just observed, say with success,
the left-handedness of a given elastic band, and want to repeat on that same elastic the same observation. According
to the procedure, all you have to do is to take again the longest fragment, grab it with your two hands, stretch it
abruptly until it breaks and observe if the longest fragment remains once more in your left hand. Clearly, the fact that
the previous observation was successful will not help at all in predicting the result of the subsequent one. Indeed, to
be re-observed, the left-handedness property, which is a relational property between the elastic and the experimental
apparatus (formed by the experimenter’s hands), has to be re-created, and the creation process is a non-deterministic
creation-1 process.
The above three features are most likely also present in a typical quantum measurement. Concerning point (2),
it is well known that a quantum measurement produces an inevitable “wave function collapse,” thus changing the
state of the entity. Also, regarding point (3), we know that most properties of microscopic entities, like for instance
the spatial localization of an electron, are ephemeral in nature [14]. Indeed, quantum mechanics teaches us that,
in general, not only can one not predict the localization of a microscopic entity prior to the measurement, but
neither a finite time following it, however small such a finite time is. Point (1), being about a “hidden mechanism,”
obviously it can only be inferred considering that the nature of quantum probabilities are non-Kolmogorovian, and
that a random selection mechanism of the hidden-measurement kind can perfectly reproduce their specific non-
Kolmogorovian nature [3, 15, 16]. (In Section VIII we show that point (3) can in fact be considered as a consequence
of points (1) and (2)).
IV. GENUINE INDETERMINISM
We are now in a position to make our point regarding the presence of a genuine form of indeterminism in our
reality, despite the possible epistemic character of quantum (or quantum-like) probabilities. Here we will understand
determinism in the restricted sense of predictability, i.e., in the sense that the results of our observations about physical
entities are always completely predictable in principle. Thus, we consider indeterminism as a failure of predictability,
i.e., as the existence of observations that cannot be predicted, not even in principle. Our point is that the result of
the observation of a property of the left-handedness kind is authentically unpredictable, i.e., that the left-handedness’
observational process is genuinely indeterministic. To see why it is so, we will proceed by considering what we think
are the only three reasonable objections to such a statement, and show that they are all inconsequential.
A. First objection: we can acquire a better control
The first objection is that the reason for the unpredictability of the left-handedness experiment is related to the
lack of control of the experimenter. Therefore, if one allows the experimenter to acquire a better control over the
7entire experimental procedure, then there would be no problems in predicting with certainty the outcome of the
experiment. Therefore, the indeterminism inherent in the observation of the left-handedness property cannot be
considered genuine.
To make this objection more precise, let us assume that point x = 0 corresponds to the end of the elastic band
fragment (of, say, total length L) which is held by the left hand, and point x = L to the end of it, which is held
by the right hand, so that for 0 < x < L/2 the outcome of the observation is unsuccessful (“no” answer), whereas
for L/2 < x < L it is successful (“yes” answer). Special consideration should be given to point x = L/2, which
in fact corresponds to a different potential property of the elastic, we may call “ambidexterity.” However, to avoid
unnecessary complications, we assume in our discussion that it is always possible in practical terms to determine
which of the two obtained fragments is the longest one (in other terms, we assume that the value x = L/2 never
occurs).
Clearly, we can distinguish here two sets of interactions: Syes = {Ix ∈ [Ix]/x ∈ (L/2, L)} and Sno = {Ix ∈ [Ix]/x ∈
(0, L/2)}, where [Ix] denotes the class of equivalent interactions which deterministically produce the same outcome,
with the elastic broken at point x and the fragment of length x (resp. L − x) in the left hand (resp. right hand) of
the experimenter. Now, if the experimenter can control the experimental procedure in order to determine in advance
if the applied interaction will be in Syes or in Sno, then no doubts s/he will be in a position to predict with certainty,
in advance, the outcome of the left-handedness observation.
To see how s/he can do this, let us consider a specific deterministic creation-2 process, I˜x, which is defined as follows:
“Take a ruler and measure the distance x from one of the two ends of the elastic fragment of length L, then using a
scissor cut the elastic fragment exactly at point x. At this point, grab the fragment of length x with your left hand
and the remaining fragment of length L−x with your right hand.” Clearly, I˜x ∈ [Ix]. The only difference with respect
to the previously defined Ix, is that they are randomly selected by the observer, in a way s/he cannot consciously
control, whereas I˜x can be selected in a perfectly conscious and controlled way. Thus, a perfectly equivalent definition
for the left-handedness property would be the following:
Definition 6 [left-handedness of an elastic band: equivalent definition]: Take the longest fragment of the elastic and
measure its length L with a ruler. After that, use a random number generator (RNG) to select a value x in the
interval (0, L), excluding a priori the specific value x = L/2. Next, applies on the elastic fragment of length L the
deterministic interaction I˜x, then observe your hands: if the longest fragment is in your left hand, the left-handedness
has been successfully observed (outcome “yes”); otherwise, the observation has been unsuccessful and the outcome is
“no.”
This alternative definition is perfectly equivalent to the original one, as is clear from the fact that the procedure
not only produces the same unpredictable outcomes, but it does so with exactly the same probability distribution
(see Def. 4, Sec. II). The advantage of this alternative equivalent definition is that it makes fully manifest what is the
part of the procedure which is effectively under the control of the experimenter – the execution of the I˜x interaction
– and the part which cannot be controlled by her/him – the selection of the x value by the RNG. So, acquiring a
better control over the experimental procedure of the left-handedness property would simply mean to replace the RNG
selection mechanism by a more determinative process. But the only way to do so is to redefine the left-handedness
observational protocol. Let us call our two previous equivalent definitions left-handedness-1, to distinguish them from
the property of left-handedness-2, which we are now going to define.
Definition 7 [left-handedness-2 of an elastic band]: Take the longest fragment of the elastic and measure its length L
with a ruler. After that, use a RNG to select a value x in the interval (0, L/2). Next, applies on the elastic fragment of
length L the interaction I˜x, then observe your hands: if the longest fragment is in your left hand, the left-handedness-2
has been successfully observed (outcome “yes”); otherwise, the observation has been unsuccessful and the outcome is
“no.”
Contrary to left-handedness-1, which is a creation-1 process, left-handedness-2 is evidently a creation-2 process, now
perfectly deterministic. In other terms, by allowing the experimenter to acquire a full control over the experimental
procedure (relative to its outcomes), we have succeeded in eliminating the source of unpredictability which was
present in the observational procedure associated to left-handedness-1, thus obtaining a fully deterministic process.
This because the outcome “yes” is now certain in advance, and left-handedness-2 is an actual property of every elastic
band. But as the saying goes: “operation successful patient dead!” Indeed, according to Definition 4, left-handedness-
1 and left-handedness-2 cannot any more be considered as equivalent observational processes, and therefore they do
not define anymore the same property. This means that if we increase the level of control of the experimenter, much
enough to eliminate the outcomes’ unpredictability, the result is that s/he will not observe any more the same property,
and this is the reason why left-handedness-1 is a genuine creation-1 process, whose built-in indeterminism cannot be
eliminated.
8B. Second objection: non-ordinary properties are not bona-fide properties
According to the above discussion, it is quite evident that one cannot get rid of the unpredictability inherent in the
non-classical left-handedness-1 property, as to do so one has to modify the property’s operational definition in such a
radical way that the modified measurement does not correspond anymore to the specification of the same property,
but of a radically different new property, which we have called left-handedness-2. In fact, all this is quite obvious (but
obviousness is what needs to be said, to make it obvious), as there are no logical reasons to consider an indeterministic
creation-1 process observationally equivalent to a deterministic creation-2 process, as we already emphasized at the
end of Sec. II. What we have tried to do is to make this point as clear and explicit as possible, using a very simple
and concrete example, where every operation is under our eyes.
Of course, the objection then is that the way we have defined the left-handedness-1 property (either in terms of
the abrupt stretching procedure, or of the equivalent scissor-RNG procedure) is such that we have included into it,
ad hoc, a condition of lack of control (and therefore an element of randomness), so that, as in a circular reasoning,
indeterminism has been proved by inserting on purpose indeterminism in the very observational procedure. This
brings us to the second possible criticism: that properties like the left-handedness-1 are not to be considered as
bona-fide properties of physical entities, and therefore should not be used to establish the existence of an irreducible
indeterminism in our physical reality.
Undoubtedly, indeterminism is a built-in element in the definition of the left-hadedness-1, but, as we will now see,
there is no logical fallacy in this. First of all, let us recall, as we previously mentioned, that observational procedures
involving an unpredictable selection mechanism are generally called product tests (or product observations), and are
used to opportunely define meet properties, i.e., properties made by the conjunction of other properties [8, 16, 17].
Meet properties express a self-evident fact of reality: that physical entities can possess (in potential or actual terms),
more than a single property at once, and product tests are just the right procedures we must employ to operationally
define and test meet properties. Obviously, when two properties are compatible, we can easily observe them (i.e.,
test them) simultaneously. For instance, a car can have the properties of being red colored and longer than 3 meters,
and there are no problems in conjunctly testing these two properties at the same time. But not all properties are
observationally compatible. A piece of wood for instance, possesses both the burnability and floatability properties,
and therefore also possesses the meet property of “burnability and floatability.” [11]. However, if we burn the piece
of wood to test burnability, we will automatically destroy floatability, and vice versa, if we bathe the piece of wood
to test floatability, we will destroy (although only temporarily) burnability. In other terms, the observational tests
associated to these two properties are mutually incompatible, and therefore cannot be performed together, at the
same time.
But, as shown by Piron, in ultimate analysis there is no need to do so. Indeed, all we need to do is to perform a
product observation consisting in first selecting randomly (i.e., in a way that cannot be predicted by the observer) either
the burnability or the floatability test, and after that performing it. Then, if the outcome is successful (unsuccessful),
we will say that also the (product) observational test of the meet property is successful (unsuccessful), i.e., that we
succeeded (failed) in observing the “burnability and floatability” meet property.
To understand why the above procedure is meaningful, we must keep in mind that an entity does actually possess
a property if and only if it is possible to predict in principle, with certainty, that its observation would be successful,
should we decide to perform it [8–10]. The key point here is that we don’t need to perform in practice an observational
test to infer the actuality of a property: it is sufficient to be in a position to predict (in principle) with certainty its
successful outcome. Now, seeing that the product test procedure involves a non-deterministic selection mechanism,
the only way we can guarantee that the observational process would be successful, should we perform it, is to know
in advance that its success is independent of such a non predictable choice. And this can only be the case if the two
properties – the burnability and floatability ones, in our example – are both actual.
So, if we admit that meet properties are testable properties (i.e., definable in operational terms and therefore
observable in practice), and considering that product tests are the right procedures to be employed to do so (at least
in relation to meet properties made of mutually incompatible properties), we have then to admit that we are not always
in a position to predict with certainty the behavior of physical entities, as we cannot do it when we observe certain of
their meet properties (see also the discussion in [13]). And this would mean that a certain level of indeterminism must
be accepted in our description of reality, being an unavoidable structural ingredient of our observational processes.
But of course, one could also defend the point of view that not all the properties we can theoretically associate
to a physical entity have necessarily to be observable/testable in practical terms. In other terms, one could consider
that meet properties are a typical example of concepts which are maybe useful in theoretical terms, but not for
this necessarily always directly testable. In conventional quantum mechanics for instance, we know that a number
of important properties are not testable, i.e., associable to a closed linear subspace of the Hilbert space [18]. For
instance, “being in a state ψ or in a state φ” is not a testable property of a quantum entity, i.e., it is not a property
that can be associated to a projection operator (unless the two states are orthogonal). This is generally the case also
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For instance, for a microscopic entity like an electron, the meet property a(R) ∧ b(C) [to be read: “a(R) and b(C)”],
where a(R) is the property of being localized in a spatial region R, and b(C) is the property of having the momentum
lying in a cone C,” cannot be associated to a projection operator, since the projection operator PR associated to a(R),
and the projection operator PC associated to b(C), do not commute. Accordingly, one could be tempted to conclude
that the meet property a(R) ∧ b(C) is not a testable (i.e., directly observable) property.
On the other hand, the previously mentioned product test (or product observation) protocol, tells us that also meet
properties of the form a(R) ∧ b(C) are in fact observable, and this independently of the fact that they are made of
experimentally incompatible properties. Indeed, from the ampler perspective of a general operational description of
physical systems, meet properties are always in principle observables, by means of product observations. Of course,
if we accept this view, we must also accept that conventional quantum mechanics is an incomplete description, as its
formalism cannot account for certain observational possibilities. In fact, that quantum mechanics is an incomplete
theory, in the sense that serious structural shortcomings would be present in its formalism, is already an established
fact, as for instance it has been clearly demonstrated that one cannot accommodate the description of separated
physical entities within its too restricted Hilbert space structure [11]. However, our purpose is not to discuss here
the shortcomings of conventional quantum mechanics, but to understand if properties like the left-handedness-1 are
physically meaningful or not, in a general operational description of physical systems. Because if they are, then a
certain level of indeterminism cannot be avoided in our description of the world.
To resolve this issue, we need to reflect on how we usually ascribe properties to physical entities. For instance, why
do we attach to the moon the intrinsic property of spatiality, i.e., the property of always having a specific location in
space, in every moment? One possible response is that since in our past interactions with solid macroscopic objects
we have always found them in a specific spatial position (although this position can possibly change over time), it is
quite natural to assume that also our satellite does always possess one, independently of the fact that we may know
it or not, or that we are presently observing it or not.
Roughly speaking, we can say that we humans, in the course of our evolution, have gained some knowledge (through
experience) about the nature and behavior of the macroscopic material entities forming our reality, by discovering
that a number of intrinsic properties can sensibly be applied to them. And these properties we have in this way
associated to these entities are typically what we have called classical properties. However, from such experience,
whether we may like it or not, a prejudice resulted: the belief that we could generalize, without problems, the results
of our observations. For instance, by considering that since the concept of spatiality can suitably be applied to all the
ordinary macroscopic objects of our everyday life, the same must hold true also for those non-ordinary microscopic
“objects” we are able to detect through the more sophisticated instruments of our laboratories, which extend the
observational power of our ordinary senses.
But we must be careful not to commit what logicians call the fallacy of hasty generalization, reaching a general
conclusion on the basis of information obtained on a sample which is not necessarily representative. Obviously, there
is no logical basis for such an inference, as we have never directly interacted, through our ordinary senses, with an
individual microscopic entity. The aforementioned prejudice, as we will see, is at the basis of our lack of understanding
about the true nature of microscopic entities, as in fact it is a false prejudice. What we would like to highlight here
is that: it is a non-ordinary procedure to attribute ordinary (classical) properties to non-ordinary entities, such as
electrons, in the same way as it is a non-ordinary procedure (although for opposite reasons) to attribute non-ordinary
(non-classical) properties to ordinary entities, such as elastic bands.
What we are here emphasizing, as we anticipated in Section II, is that what determines the classical or quantum
nature of certain physical entities is not the fact that they are microscopic or macroscopic, but the nature of the
properties we believe we can meaningfully associate to them, and therefore observe in practical terms. The important
point to understand is that the classical or non-classical character of a property does not depend on the property
in itself, but on its specific relation with the entity to which the property is associated, and possibly observed (i.e.,
tested). If the spatial localization of the moon can be associated to an ordinary observational procedure of the
discovery-2 kind, the same we cannot say about the spatial localization of an electron.
So, if one defends the view that properties like the left-handedness-1 cannot to be considered as bona-fide properties
of physical entities, because they would be associated to non-ordinary procedures, then the same must be said,
mutatis mutandis, for the property of spatial localization associated to a microscopic entity like an electron. Thus, the
conclusion is: either we consider that only pure discovery procedures, associated to ordinary observational processes,
are allowed in our description of reality (and this, by the way, would also be a quite radical position to adopt), and then
we have to stop speaking about the observation of the localization of an electron, but also of its momentum, energy,
spin, etc.; or else, we accept that our observational processes necessarily extend beyond mere discovery procedures,
and then creation-1 processes must also be considered as bona-fide observational processes.
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C. Third objection: we can observe the observer
We come now to the third objection, which from a certain perspective may be considered as the more serious one.
Let us call the observer performing the observation of the left-handedness-1 property observer-A. As we previously
explained, because of the impossibility of acquiring a better control over the observational procedure without altering
it, observer-A is not in a position to predict the result of her/his observation, which therefore has to be considered,
at least for her/him, as genuinely indeterministic.
But what about a second observer – let us call it observer-B – observing the scene. Let us assume that observer-B
has gathered enough knowledge about the state of observer-A and the state the elastic band, and that thanks to this
knowledge s/he is in a position to fully describe the deterministic evolution of the double-system “elastic-observer-A”
in the laboratory context, and therefore also predict its future states with certainty.
In other words, if observer-B has sufficient computing power to simulate every detail of the evolution of the “elastic-
observer-A” composite system in the laboratory context, taking into account the tiniest possible fluctuations, then
s/he will be in a position to determine in advance, at least in principle, what will be the outcome of observer-A’s
experiment with the elastic, i.e., if the longest fragment will dangle from her/his left or right hand.
Let us assume, in accordance with the deterministic hypothesis, that observer-B can actually predict with certainty
that the outcome of observer-A’s observation of the left-handedness-1 property will be successful, i.e., that the final
state of the elastic band will be a left-handed state. Accordingly, one may be tempted to conclude that the observation
of the left-handedness-1 property, while an indeterministic process for observer-A, is a deterministic process for
observer-B. Consequently, the indeterminism subtended by the observation of the left-handedness-1 property by
observer-A would not be genuine, but just an illusion, as the outcome of the observational process appears to be
predictable by observer-B.
But such a conclusion is not permitted. Indeed, observer-B is not actually observing the same entity as observer-A,
nor the same property. Observer-A is observing the left-handedness-1 property of an elastic band, and to do so
s/he has to apply a specific invasive procedure, which operationally defines the property in question. The only way
observer-A has to predict the result in advance, is to increase her/his control, but as we already discussed in Sec. IV A,
if s/he does so s/he will not any more observe the same property. Therefore, for observer-A the indeterminism inherent
in the observational process is irreducible.
On the other hand, the observational process of observer-B is completely different: it is apparently a non-invasive
procedure referring to a bigger system, made of the elastic band plus observer-A. It is this bigger “elastic-observer-
A” double-system that observer-B is actually observing, and the observational protocol is the following: “Let the
system, in a given known initial state, evolve by itself and, by sight, just look at the components called ‘human hands’
until they have broken the component called ‘elastic band’; if the subcomponents thus obtained, called ‘fragments of
the elastic band,’ are such that the longest one is associated with the left hand, then the observation is considered
successful; otherwise, it is considered unsuccessful.”
In other terms, assuming that observer-B knows the initial state of the double-system and is able in principle to
predict its evolution, its observational process is of the discovery-2 kind. Also, its observation is not about a property
of the single elastic band, but of the ampler “elastic-observer-A” double-system. Of course, it may be objected
that even though observer-B is observing a bigger system, by doing so s/he is also observing its components, so that
observer-B is also observing the elastic band, and therefore, indirectly, s/he is observing its left-handedness-1 property.
This however would be again an illicit conclusion. Indeed, even if we reinterpret the above experimental protocol as
an observational protocol only referring to the elastic band, clearly such a protocol cannot be considered as equivalent
to the one associated to the left-handedness-1 observational process, described in Sec. III (Def. 5), considering our
definition of equivalency, given in Sec. II (Def. 4). So, even considering the observation of observer-B as an observation
of the elastic band, we must conclude s/he is not observing the same property of it, so that the fact s/he can in principle
predict with certainty the outcome of the observation is not in contradiction with the presence of a genuine form of
indeterminism inherent in observational processes of the left-handedness-1 kind.
Also, in the above description of the discovery-2 observational procedure of observer-B, it wasn’t specified by which
means the initial state of the double-system happened to be known. Actually, to know the initial state one needs to
prepare the system in that state, and if we include, as we should, such a preparation procedure into the operational
protocol of observer-B, then we cannot anymore affirm that its observation would be of the discovery-2 kind, but in
fact of the creation-2 kind. But then, also in this case, the same reasoning as per above applies. On the other hand,
in case observer-B wouldn’t prepare the double-system in a given, known state, then s/he wouldn’t be in a position
to predict the outcome of the observation, and therefore her/his observational process would be an indeterministic
discovery-1 process. Thus, we must conclude that a genuine, irreducible form of indeterminism has to be accepted as
an integral part of our description of reality.
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V. GENUINE NON-SPATIALITY
In this section we will strengthen our point regarding the genuine indeterminism built-in in our observation of the
world, by drawing a suggestive parallel between the left-handedness observation on a macroscopic elastic-entity, and
a spatial localization observation (measurement) on a microscopic entity. Before doing so, let us just emphasize that,
according to the logic of our previous discussion, a powerful strategy to understand the puzzling nature of microscopic
entities is clearly to ask non-ordinary operational questions in relation to ordinary macroscopic entities, and see how
they respond to these questions in practical terms. This is the program that was initiated by Aerts many years ago,
when he conceived a number of mechanical macroscopic machines able to imitate the quantum behavior of microscopic
entities [1, 2, 4–7], revealing in this way the hidden measurement mechanism that is possibly at the origin of quantum
probabilities [2, 3].
Having said this, to draw a parallel between the non-classical left-handedness observation and a typical localization
observation, let us consider the property of “being localized in R,” with R a given arbitrary region of space (not
necessarily bounded). Let us call it the R-localization property. For a classical point particle, R-localization is
obviously a classical property, but for a quantum microscopic entity it is a typical non-classical property. Indeed, if
ψt is the state of the entity at time t, and PR the projection operator onto the set of states localized in the region R,
then the probability ‖PRψt‖2 of finding the entity inside R, at time t, is in general different from 1 or 0. This means
that the two possible outcomes of the observation – “yes,” the entity is present inside R, or “no,” the entity is not
present inside of R – are not predetermined.
In other terms, denoting by R¯ = R3\R the complement of R in R3, we can say that, before the observation, the
microscopic entity, say an electron, is in a superposition state ψt = PRψt + PR¯ψt with respect to the alternative of
being present in one of the two mutually excluding regions R and R¯, in the sense that neither the R-localization,
nor the R¯-localization, are actual properties of the electron. Similarly, if we define the right-handedness property by
means of the same observational protocol as for the left-handedness, but reversing the “yes-no” alternative, we can say
that also the elastic band, before the observation, is in a superposition state with respect of the two possible outcomes
of the experiment, in the sense that neither the left-handedness, nor the right-handedness, are actual properties of
the elastic, but just potential properties of it.
Now, considering this deep analogy between the electron’s localization measurement, and the elastic band’s lat-
eralization observations (in both cases the outcome is only predictable in probabilistic terms, although the state of
the system is perfectly known), what can we conclude about the spatiality of a microscopic entity? According to the
logic of our analysis, we are forced to conclude that neither the R-localization, nor the R¯-localization of the electron
are properties which pre-exist their observation, and therefore, contrary to the ordinary objects of the macroscopic
world, an electron cannot be considered as an entity generally present in our three-dimensional space. In other words,
an electron does not actually possess a specific location, except in the moment it is detected by an instrument of
observation, in the same way as an elastic band does not actually possess a specific (type 1) left or right lateralization,
except when such a lateralization is actualized (created) through an observation.
This is also so because, among other things, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle forbids us to observe simultaneously
the position of the electron and how its position varies locally in time, i.e., its velocity, so that we have no possibility
(by solving the classical equations of motion) to predict with certainty the outcome of a localization measurement,
and therefore the reality criterion for such a property no longer applies [14]. There are in fact many other reasons
we could advocate to conclude about the surprising non-spatiality of microscopic entities, but we will not do it here,
not to overly extend an already long article, and simply refer the interested reader to the following papers (and the
references cited therein), where this fundamental notion is extensively explored and discussed [2, 5, 7, 14, 19]
It is worth noticing that microscopic entities, such as electrons, while being non-spatial entities, are nevertheless
fully available to relate with the macroscopic entities forming our ordinary three-dimensional space, in the sense that
they are fully available in manifesting their presence in this space, in the ambit of an observational process, i.e., of a
possible interaction with a macroscopic entity, playing the role of the measuring apparatus. This means that although
there is no way in general to predict with certainty whether the observation of an electron (of which we assume to
know the state) in a given region R of space (or in its complement R¯ = R3\R), will give a positive or negative outcome,
we can nevertheless predict with certainty that if the observation extends to the entire three-dimensional space, then
the probability of detecting its presence would become equal to 1, as is clear that, because of the normalization of
state vectors, ‖(PR + PR¯)ψt‖2 = ‖ψt‖2 = 1, for all t ∈ R.
Here we find ourselves in a situation very similar to that of the experiment about the left-handedness-1 (or right-
handedness-1) of the elastic band. Indeed, as well as the elastic band is fully available to interact with the two hands
of the human observer, in order to actualize either the left-handedness-1 or the right-handedness-1 property, in the
same way an electron is fully available to interact with the two spatial regions R and R¯ (more precisely, with the
position detectors which are placed within them), to actualize either the R-localization or the R¯-localization property.
These localization properties are literally created at the very moment of their observation, and therefore it wouldn’t
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make sense to say that before the observation the electron was actually present in one of the two regions. The only
thing we can say is that it was potentially present in both regions, in the same way as an elastic band is potentially both
left-handed-1 and right-handed-1. We cannot say either that the electron, before the observation, was simultaneously
actually present in both regions, as this means that it would be simultaneously detectable in both regions, whereas
an electron can only show itself, when observed, in a single spatial location at a time (as well as a left-handedness-1
experiment can only give a positive or negative outcome, but not both outcomes simultaneously).
Also, as we must not confuse the full availability of an elastic band (for the very fact of its existence) to participate
in a left-handedness-1 experiment, with the possible outcomes of the experiment, so we must not confuse the full
availability of an electron (for the very fact of its existence) to participate in an experiment of spatial localization,
with the possible outcomes of the experiment. In fact, while it is true that an electron is always observable in our
physical three-dimensional (ordinary) space, that is, detectable in it with probability equal to 1, this doesn’t mean
that it actually possesses a specific localization inside of it. We have here a typical example of a situation in which
the assumption of reductionism does not apply. Indeed, while on one hand we can affirm that the electron is globally
present in the entire three-dimensional physical space (in the sense of being detectable in it with certainty), at all
times, on the other hand we cannot conclude from this that it is locally present in one of its regions, i.e., in one
of its parts. And this means that in general the nature of the relationship of an electron with the totality of the
three-dimensional space cannot be deduced from its relationship with its parts. And of course, we approach here the
true mystery of the microscopic world, which turns out to be populated by entities whose non-spatial nature is quite
different from that of macroscopic entities, and therefore cannot be described and understood in the same way.
When we are dealing with microscopic entities, such as electrons, the metaphor that consists in thinking of our
three dimensional physical space as a container no longer applies. Or, rather, it does not apply if we consider the
observation of the spatial position of an electron in the usual sense of a process through which the electron would
reveal an already acquired presence in a given region of space, and not as a process through which an electron would
be forced to manifest its presence in that region.
By this, we mean that because an electron is fully available in globally manifesting itself in spatial terms, it is always
possible to exploit this global availability to confer to its manifestation a specific, predetermined outcome. We can do
this in the same way in which we can exploit the full availability of an elastic band in letting itself be cut, to define a
different concept of left-handedness, that we have called left-handedness-2, which corresponds to a property actually
possessed by the elastic band, even before its observation (as the successful outcome of its observation can be known
in advance).
For example, we can in principle always apply in region R¯ a repulsive force field, so that the probability for the
electron to be detected in R¯ will tend to zero, as the intensity of the repulsive field increases. In other words, by
increasing the repulsiveness of the applied field in region R¯, it is possible to increase the control of the observer over
her/his spatial detection experiment. Let us call R-localization-2 the property of an electron to be detected in region
R, when in the complement region R¯ a virtually infinite repulsive field is applied (we limit here our discussion to
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, to avoid problems with Klein paradox). Obviously, we can then affirm that the
electron actually possesses the R-localization-2, as is clear that we can predict with certainty that, if we carry out
the observational experiment, the electron would inevitably be detected in region R. We can therefore say that an
electron certainly always possesses, in actual terms, a type 2 localization, whereas it doesn’t possess a localization in
the ordinary sense, which we will call localization-1, to distinguish it from localization-2.
Definition 8 [localization-1 and localization-2]. An entity possess the localization-1 property (and is said to belong
to the ordinary physical space) if, for every (sufficiently large) arbitrary region R (R 6= R3) of the three-dimensional
Euclidean physical space, its detection in either R or in the complement region R¯ = R3\R, is predictable in advance
with certainty (i.e., either R-localization-1 or R¯-localization-1 is actual for the entity). On the other hand, an entity
possesses the localization-2 property if, for every arbitrary region R (R 6= R3) of the three-dimensional Euclidean
physical space, when the entity is prevented (by some active form of control) to manifest in the complement region R¯,
it is detectable in R with certainty.
The observation of localization-2 is a process that, like the observation of left-handedness-2, is entirely under the
control of the experimenter, in the sense that the outcome of the observational process can be predicted with absolute
certainty. This means that localization-2 is a property that a microscopic entity, like an electron, always possesses in
a stable way, independently of whether it is or is not observed in practical terms, i.e., made manifest. It expresses the
full availability of such entity to relate with the structure of the three-dimensional space as a whole (and more exactly
with the macroscopic entities that characterize it), through its “confinability” in a specific region of the same (in the
sense of being detectable with certainty in that region), when its presence in any other region is actively prevented.
In other words, localization-2 is a weaker form of spatial localization which is generally possessed by microscopic
entities, allowing them, under certain conditions of active control, to deterministically relate with specific parts of
our space. Now, since to relate to the three-dimensional space and its parts means, in ultimate analysis, to relate
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with the macroscopic entities that inhabit it, localization-2 is nothing but the property allowing a microscopic entity
to bind to a macroscopic entity, that is to form what is usually referred to as a bound state, so acquiring the same
localization-1 property of the latter.
When a microscopic entity binds to a macroscopic entity, that is, becomes part of it, not only it manifests the
property of localization-2, but in fact also acquires (i.e., actualizes) in a sense the localization-1 property possessed by
the macroscopic entity. Exactly in the same way as an elastic band, when it manifests its left-handedness-2, obviously
also manifests, in the same moment, left-handedness-1, since the successful outcome of the experiment characterizing
left-handedness-2 is the same as the one determining left-handedness-1. Thus, we can affirm that microscopic entities
are entities that usually do not possess the property of belonging to the ordinary three-dimensional (Euclidean) space,
as they do not actually possess, permanently, the localization-1 property, which is possessed instead by macroscopic
entities. On the other hand, because they do possess the localization-2 property, which is an expression of their full
availability in binding with specific macroscopic entities, they can nevertheless enter and reside permanently in the
ordinary physical space, in the form of aggregates, when they are forced to do so under some active form of control.
But if a macroscopic aggregate stably possesses the property of localization-1, and therefore can be considered an
(ordinary) spatial entity, we must be careful not to think of its individual components as entities that would also
possess the same property. Contrary to the hypothesis of reductionism, it is not the spatiality of the microscopic
constituents that confer to the macroscopic body its spatiality: spatiality is an emergent property, that the individual
components only possess when all together, for as long as they maintain their specific and exclusive relationship, but
will immediately lose as soon as their connection from the macroscopic aggregate is severed.
VI. MENTAL PROCESSES AND CONCEPTUAL ENTITIES
A major difficulty in understanding the emergence of spatiality of macroscopic entities, from the non-spatial layer
of microscopic entities, could be our insistence in thinking about the latter in mere objectual terms. Still, one may
wonder what other picture we would have at our disposal to mentally visualize the entities of the microworld, which
in addition to their staggering lack of spatiality present a number of other oddities, like their well-known lack of
distinguishability, their tendency to produce interferences, form connections of all kinds regardless of spatial distances
(entanglement), and so on.
A possible answer comes to us once again from the pioneering work of Aerts. Indeed, recently the already broad
explanatory framework of the creation-discovery view has been further expanded in order to embrace an even more
general class of systems, called state-context-property systems (SCoP), thanks to which it becomes possible to describe
not only the action of an experimental context on a given system (as is usual in physics), but also the influence of the
system on the context itself [17].
The advantage of such a general approach, among other things, is to allow the description not only of physical
entities (classical, quantum or quantum-like), but also of more abstract entities, such as human concepts, human
minds, and the decision processes associated with them. This has allowed to discover that such a generalization of the
formal structure of quantum mechanics lent itself surprisingly well to the construction of a quali-quantitative theory
of human concepts and their combinations (see the references cited in [20–23]).
Obviously, we cannot enter here into the details of this theory, which is very articulated and would go beyond the
scope of the present article. What we want to highlight is just that following the discovery that the structure of the
quantum formalism is perfectly able to model human concepts, a rather unusual, but not less natural idea quickly
emerged, summarizable in the following question [20]: “If quantum mechanics as a formalism models human concepts
so well, perhaps this indicates that quantum particles themselves are conceptual entities?”
This fascinating interrogative has given rise to a very innovative interpretation of quantum physics, which is based
precisely on the assumption that the nature of quantum entities would be conceptual, in the sense that these entities
would interact with the macroscopic measuring instruments (and more generally with the entities made of ordinary
matter) in a way similar as how human concepts interact with human minds (or other memory structures sensitive
to the meaning of the concepts) [20–23].
As is known, human concepts are typically non-spatial entities. Indeed, one can hardly say that they belong to
our three-dimensional space, but rather to a mental space, abstract in nature. Of course, the mental space of human
concepts, in the typical view of materialism and reductionism, originates precisely in the activity of the human brains,
which are naturally contained in the ordinary spatial theater. But independently of the fact that human concepts
originate from (or only from) our specific localized brain-structures, the fact remains that the spatiality of a human
concept, such as for example the concept “fruit,” is quite different from the spatiality of an ordinary physical object.
In fact, the concept “fruit” being an abstract entity, it doesn’t actually possess, in a stable way, the property
of localization-1, which is instead typical of concrete objects, while it unquestionably possesses the property of
localization-2, since the fruit-concept is always fully available in interacting with specific semantic entities, for instance
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formed by specific aggregates of concepts, in the context of specific phrases, to produce a predetermined localization.
In other words, in the same way an electron is able to relate/bind (in an ephemeral or stable way, depending on the
type of experimental context) to a specific macroscopic system, thus manifesting its presence in the three-dimensional
theater, also the human concept “fruit” can temporarily assume the status of an object, when it relates/binds with a
specific objectifying context, for instance in the ambit of the following injunctive sentence: “Look at the fruit which
in this moment is on the table!”
If on the table in question there are two fruits, an apple and a pear, the experimental context is such that in
order to act the above-mentioned injunction a human being must choose which of the two object-fruits to stare at,
by selecting a specific visual interaction, attributing in this way to the abstract concept “fruit” a specific ephemereal
objectual form, and the corresponding spatial localization associated to it. And since the decision process is usually
quite sensitive to intrapsychic and extrapsychic fluctuations, in no way it will be in general predictable in advance.
Therefore, we are in a situation which is akin to the observation of the localization-1 property of a microscopic entity:
as is the case for an electron, the abstract human concept “fruit” doesn’t ordinarily possess, in actual terms, the
localization-1 property.
 
 fruit  apple 
or 
fruit  pear ? 
? 
 Look at the fruit which 
in this moment is on 
the table! 
 
FIG. 2: The “fruit” abstract concept is ephemerally objectified into the concrete concept of the apple or the pear, in a way
which is generally unpredictable, by means of the experimental context expressed by the injunctive phrase “Look at the fruit
which in this moment is on the table!”
On the other hand, if we modify the experimental context, replacing the injunctive sentence by the following one:
“Look at the fruit which in this moment is closer to you, on the table!” then the human being acting the injunction
will not anymore relate to the pear, and this means that this new context is now forcing the concept “fruit” to identify
with a perfectly predeterminable object, and assume its spatial localization, which is the one of the apple. Thus, we
are in a situation corresponding to the observation of the classical localization-2 property.
As this simple example illustrates, the non-spatiality of human abstract concepts is very similar to the non-spatiality
of quantum microscopic entities. It is important however to emphasize that the analogy between human concepts and
microscopic entities, considered as conceptual entities, is much deeper and articulated than what could be understood
by the abovementioned fruit-example, as demonstrated by the careful analysis of Aerts and collaborators. In fact,
human concepts are able to express almost all the complex phenomena typical of the microscopic quantum level, such
as entanglement, violation of Bell’s inequalities, superposition and interferences, coherence (which in the ambit of
human concepts becomes connection through meaning), incompatibility (expression of the impossibility for a concept
of being simultaneously maximally abstract and concrete), etc. [20–23].
But while taking into account these similarities, it is important not to fall victims of too easy anthropomorphisms
and confuse human concepts with the microscopic quantum entities, or human minds with the measuring apparatus
in a laboratory. What the profound analysis of Aerts teaches us is simply that human concepts are not the only
conceptual entities we humans are dealing with, since also the entities of the microscopic world, like electrons, have
that typical behavior that we humans usually attach to concepts, and not to objects.
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fruit  apple! 
 Look at the fruit which 
in this moment is closer 
to you, on the table! 
 
FIG. 3: The “fruit” abstract concept is stably objectified in the concrete concept of the apple present on the left side of the
table, by means of the determinative experimental context expressed by the injunctive phrase “Look at the fruit which in this
moment is closer to you, on the table!” (The additional fragment of sentence “closer to you” plays here the same role as the
repulsive field in the case of the electron, or the scissor in the case of the elastic band).
VII. CONTROL VERSUS DISCRIMINATION
Our parallel between the lateralization property of an elastic band, the objectification process of an abstract human
concept, like a fruit, and the localization property of a microscopic entity, like an electron, offers us a further argument
in support of our thesis about the presence of an irreducible form of indeterminism in our description of reality. Indeed,
if we really want to deterministically observe an electron in a given region of space, nothing in principle impedes us
to do so: we only have to force it to manifest in that region, by precluding its manifestation in any other place. This
kind of observational procedure, which is a creation-2 process, cannot however be considered as a spatial detection of
the electron in the ordinary sense. Indeed, detection doesn’t mean forced capture, i.e., to coerce the electron to appear
in a specific place, but just to observe if it will appear in a specific place, when it is allowed to do so (for instance
because a detection instrument is placed in that region).
This doesn’t mean though that the observational process will be for this non-invasive: interacting with a detection
instrument (like for instance a screen) is undoubtedly an invasive process, which will sensibly alter the state of
the electron. But we must distinguish here two different levels of invasiveness: there is the level which may be
intrinsically incorporated in the observational process itself, and therefore cannot be eliminated (like when we observe
the burnability of a piece of wood), and there is the level which depends on the amount of control we want to exert in
the experimental procedure, to make it more or less deterministic. A perfectly controlled observational experiment is
a procedure such that the entity under investigation is actively acted upon in a way as to limit its degrees of freedom,
so that only a specific single outcome will be left open, and therefore will be necessarily actualized.
Although experimenting with entities by means of perfectly controlled, deterministic observational processes can
certainly reveal many of their important characteristics (especially when the observational processes are of the discov-
ery kind), it cannot reveal all of them. For instance, considering the fully controlled observation of the localization-2
property, it is clear that an electron and a macroscopic body both possess such a property in actuality. But this
means that such a controlled observation, where the effects of fluctuations in the selection of outcomes is filtered out,
will not be able to reveal the deep difference between the non-locality (i.e., non-spatiality) of a microscopic entity,
like an electron, and the typical locality (spatiality) of a macroscopic corpuscle.
In other terms, by only relying on fully controlled procedures, we cannot fully characterize the different entities
forming our reality and form a complete picture of them. It is in fact in the ambit of uncontrolled observations of
localization-1 properties that microscopic entities like electrons are able to reveal, among other things, their genuine
non-ordinary spatial nature (i.e., their locality of type 1: the fact that in general they can only enter the three-
dimensional physical space in an ephemeral way), that distinguishes them from macroscopic local bodies, which
belong to the three-dimensional space in a stable way.
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for elastic bands. Indeed, imagine that we don’t know exactly how the elastics
have been manufactured. For instance, let us assume that although exteriorly the elastics look uniform, in the sense
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that their longitudinal section is constant all along their length, interiorly they are made of a non-uniform material,
in the sense that there are specific segments of the elastic bands which are more easy to break than others, when
the elastics are stretched (for instance because the density of the rubber is not uniform) [28]. Then, the structural
difference between uniform and non-uniform elastic bands cannot be discriminated by only performing fully controlled
observations of the left-handedness-2 property, as such property is always actual for both uniform and non-uniform
elastics. On the other hand, their difference may be revealed by analyzing the statistics of the outcomes of the
indeterministic observation of left-handedness-1 property (provided of course that the non-uniform elastics are all
identical, the observations are performed a sufficient number of times and the bands are always grabbed with the
same orientation). [29]
The moral of the story is that although an increase of experimental control allows for more predictable outcomes,
at the same time it severely limits our ability to bring about all the structural differences among the different entities
populating our reality. In some sense, the greater is our control in determining specific outcomes, the lower will be our
discriminative power, i.e., our ability to grasp the full spectrum of characteristics of the entity under investigation.
This is so also because, as we tried to emphasize in this paper, increasing the control over the observation of a specific
property will inevitably radically alter the observational process, so that the property which is observed will not any
more be the same property.
Thus, although we certainly agree with Aerts when he states that [2] “There is [...] no problem with the deterministic
hypothesis. There is no incompatibility at all between quantum mechanics and a complete deterministic world as a
whole, since the probabilities appearing in the quantum theory can be explained as being due to a lack of knowledge
about the interaction between the measuring apparatus and the entity during the measurement, and hence are of
epistemic nature,” we think such a statement should be understood in the sense that: there is no incompatibility
between quantum mechanics and determinism, as all interactions between physical entities and measuring apparatus
can be assumed to be deterministic; however, this doesn’t allow us to conclude that all observational processes are also
deterministic, or could be made such, as genuinely indeterministic creation-1 processes are a key ingredient in our
discriminative analysis of the physical reality, and we cannot get rid of them if we want to obtain the most possible
complete picture of it.
VIII. RELATIONAL PROPERTIES
In the previous section we have emphasized that our reality is richer than what purely deterministic, fully controlled
observations would allow us to establish: if we want a complete picture of reality, then we need to also include in
our observations a condition of lack of control, from which indeterminism, in the sense of a genuine unpredictability,
results. In this section, we want to consider how indeterminism is responsible for the emergence of relational properties
in typical quantum observational processes, and therefore to their observed ephemerality, as we already emphasized
in Section III.
The concept of relational properties, as opposed to the concept of intrinsic properties, was discussed by the present
author in a recent paper [13], where the difference between intrinsic properties, that an entity can possess inde-
pendently of a specific observer (and therefore are equivalently observable by different observers), and (relational)
properties, characterized by a specific configuration of the composite system formed by the observed entity plus a
specific observation instrument, was emphasized.
Before stating our definition of relational property, we would like to mention that the relevance of relational
properties in quantum mechanics was also discussed some time ago by Gomatam [25]. When we analyzed relational
properties in [7], we weren’t aware of [25], and therefore we take the opportunity of the present discussion to put our
analysis also in the perspective of what has been proposed by Gomatam.
Gomatam rightly pointed out that: [25] “[...] in a consistent interpretation of quantum theory, if the macroscopic
world would also have a quantum description, then a macroscopic object must possess more physical properties than
those accounted for by classical mechanics.” This is what we have also emphasized in Section IV C of this paper,
when we have distinguished ordinary properties from non-ordinary ones.
Gomatam pursues his discussion proposing that relational properties could correspond to these additional properties
a classical object can have. He distinguishes them from what he calls primary properties (i.e., intrinsic properties, in
the language of the present article), by means of the following characterization: [25] “[...] while the primary properties
are only expressed by a relation with another object (such as a scale or a clock), the relational properties are expressed
by and actualized in a relation with another object.”
In other terms, according to Gomatam, the characteristic of a relational property, as opposed to an intrinsic one, is
that a relational property would be an actual property only in the moment it is an observed property. As an example,
Gomatam considers a book, which clearly possesses intrinsic (primary) properties (like having a certain mass, volume,
etc), but can also be used, for instance, as a paperweight. He then suggests that paperweightness would precisely
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be a relational property that, I quote: [25] “can be regarded as a potential property of the object, which becomes
‘physically real’ only when the object is placed in an appropriate spatio-temporal relation with another object” (like
a stack of paper).
What Gomatam however doesn’t explain is why a relational property like the paperweightness of a book would only
be actualized when the book exhibits a specific relation with the stack of paper-measuring apparatus. Why such a
property cannot be possessed by the book also when it doesn’t entertain such specific relation with a stack of paper?
To answer this fundamental question, we need to complete Gomatam’s example of paperweightness by providing a
specific operational definition of such a property. Only in this way it becomes possible to truly understand the essence
of what a relational property is, and provide what we think is a general definition.
An important point to emphasize is that paperweightness can conventionally be defined in different, non equivalent
ways, and according to the chosen definition it can either be understood as an intrinsic property of a book, or as a
relational one. More precisely, let us here distinguish paperweightness-1 from paperweightness-2, as we distinguished
in the previous sections left-handedness-1 from left-handedness-2, and localization-1 from localization-2.
Definition 9 [paperweightness-1 of a book]. In the location where the book is present (say, an office) place a suitable
number of stacks of paper and of human beings [30]. Then monitor the location for one hour, by means of a hidden
camera. If, before the end of that time period, the persons in that location place the book on one of the stacks of paper,
then paperweightness-1 has been successfully observed; otherwise, the observation is to be considered unsuccessful.
Definition 10 [paperweightness-2 of a book]. Take the book and place it on a stack of paper of your choice. If you
succeed in performing this action, then paperweightness-2 has been successfully observed; otherwise, the observation is
to be considered unsuccessful.
It is important to understand the difference between these two properties: paperweightness-1 is a relational property
of the book, whereas paperweightness-2 is an intrinsic property of the book. That paperweightness-2 is an actual,
intrinsic property of the book, is clear from the fact that the observational process that defines it is of the creation-2
kind: it changes the position-state of the book in a deterministic way, creating a specific relation between the book
and a given stack of paper. A book always possesses such a property, even when it is not placed on a stack of paper,
as we can predict with certainty that, should we decide to observe it, the observation would be certainly successful.
What about the paperweightness-1 property of a book? In this case it is not anymore about observing the availability
of the book in lending itself to the action of a human being, in order to be positioned in a specific spatial relation
with a stack of paper: paperweightness-1 is about observing the effective availability of the book in manifesting such a
relation, when a certain number of stacks of paper and human beings are present in its environment, that we haven’t
instructed in whatsoever way to act deterministically in order to create such a relation.
This means that the definition of paperweightness-1 do not contemplate the possibility for the observer to predict
in advance, with certainty, the outcome of the observation. When s/he looks to the book during the one hour time
period required by protocol, s/he may see it or not on a stack of paper, and this depends on the way the humans who
are present in the environment will think about using the book. They may leave it in its initial position, place it on
the shelves of a library, read it, or maybe use it as a paperweight. This depends on a number of fluctuating factors
which are not under the control of the observer, considering how paperweightness-1 has been defined.
A question then arises: is the observation of paperweightness-1 a creation-1 process or a discovery-1 process (see
Def. 1 and Def. 2)? Actually, considering the way we have defined it, it’s clearly a creation-1 process. Indeed, as a
result of the observation, the book state will possibly change (by changing its spatial position and orientation) and
this change of state is provoked by the fact that we have placed in the location under consideration a certain number
of stacks of papers and of human beings which, together with the hidden camera, are part of the observer’s measuring
apparatus.
On the other hand, if we consider that the stacks of paper and human beings are part of the natural environment of
the book-entity, then the observer with her/his hidden camera is not going to alter, in any way, the evolution of the
book-entity, so that the observation could now to be considered a discovery-1 process. In principle, every creation-1
process can be reframed as a discovery-1 process, if we conventionally describe the measuring apparatus as part of
the entity’s natural environment. However, if we do this, we must keep in mind that we are not anymore observing
the same property, nor actually the same system (see the discussion of Sec. IV C).
The reader will have certainly noticed the similarity between the paperweightness-1 property of a book and the
localization-1 property of a microscopic particle. The stacks of paper play here the same role for the book than the
position detectors for a microscopic entity. When a microscopic entity, say an electron, is not present in space, it is
like a book which is not placed on a stack of paper; and when the electron is detected in space, i.e., when it creates,
momentarily or stably, a relation with a specific macroscopic entity, it is like the book establishing a relation with
a stack of paper, being positioned on top of it. Having said this, let us now conclude our analysis and explain why
paperweightness-1 is genuinely relational, whereas paperweightness-2 is not. For this, it is time to provide our specific
definition of what a relational property is:
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Definition 11 [relational property]. A property associated to an entity is relational if and only if there are states of
the entity for which the observations of the property by different observers are not deterministically equivalent.
The term “observer” in the above definition is to be understood in the sense of an instrument of observation (plus
possibly a human being able to interpret the outcomes of the process, according to a given protocol). By the term
“deterministically equivalent,” we mean equivalency as per point (1) of Def. 4.
Obviously, Def. 11 hints to the fact that a relational property is about an exclusive relation between the system
under consideration and a specific observer. In [13], as a paradigmatic example, we have considered the property of
a macroscopic body of having its center of mass in a specific spatial position x. The property is relational because a
different observer, associated to different reference frame, will necessarily observe, at the same time, a different values
x’ 6= x for the body’s center of mass position, so that their observations cannot be considered to be deterministically
equivalent. To have a specific position in space is in fact to have a specific relation with a reference frame which
makes such a position manifest.
Consider now the observation of properties like the left-handedness-1 of an elastic band, the R-localization-1 of an
electron, or the paperweightness-1 of a book. These are also relational properties, but for a different reason than the
previous example. Here the relational aspect of the property is due to the fact that the outcome of an observational
process is genuinely unpredictable. Thus, observations by different observers are not deterministically equivalent, but
only indeterministically equivalent, in the sense specified by point (2) of Def. 4.
In other terms, it is the genuine unpredictability of the outcome of the observation that makes the above mentioned
“type 1” properties the expression of an exclusive relation of the entity with a specific observer (i.e., with a specific
measuring apparatus). Indeed, if a same observation would have been performed by a different observer, at the same
moment, a different outcome would have possibly resulted.
This of course is also true for the paperweightness-1 property, since a “different observer” means here a different
way to implement the observational protocol, for instance by placing the stacks of paper in a slightly different way in
the location, or choosing different persons to participate in the experiment, as these differences, however small they
are, certainly have the capacity to affect the final outcome.
However, if we would have decided to define differently the paperweightness-1 property, as a purely non-invasive
observational process, considering for this that the stacks of papers and the persons present in the location would be
part of the natural environment of the book-entity, then of course the observational protocol would simply be about
the observation, by means of a hidden camera, of a possible relation of the book-entity with some others entities
present in the environment. But this observation can be equivalently performed by different observers, and therefore
cannot anymore be considered as a relational property of the book-entity. However, as we emphasized many times in
this article, a paperweightness-1 redefined in this way would not correspond any more to the same property.
The analysis of this section allows us to clarify our statement about quantum measurements which, as we briefly
discussed in Sec. III, would result from [13]: (1) the presence of a random selection mechanism; (2) of an irreducible
invasiveness of the observational process; and (3) of the ephemerality of the observed property, due to its relational
character. We now understand that point (3) is in fact not independent from points (1) and (2), but actually a direct
consequence of them. Indeed, the invasiveness of the process is responsible for the creation of a specific outcome, i.e, of
a specific relation between the observed entity and the measuring apparatus. But because of the random mechanism
that selects/creates the outcome, such a relation is unique to that specific measuring apparatus, and to no other.
Therefore, it is not the expression of an intrinsic property, of the entity under consideration, put of a relational one,
according to Def. 11.
This relational character, in turn, is responsible for the typical ephemerality of quantum properties [13, 14]. Indeed,
once an observational process is completed, usually the exclusive relation between the entity and the measuring
apparatus is broken (in the case of lefthandedness-1, this happens when the observer’s hands let go the elastic
fragments), so that to observe the property in question again, one has to recreate it, by following once more the
corresponding non-deterministic observational procedure, which of course doesn’t guarantee that the outcome will
be again successful. Hence the ephemerality of the property, which can only be attributed to the entity in the very
moment it is observed. [31]
We conclude this section with a last remark. One should not confuse the present concept of relationality with
the one of Rovelli [26]. In so-called relational quantum mechanics, introduced by Rovelli, it is the state itself of a
physical entity which is considered to be observer-dependent. On the contrary, in the present paradigm, the state of a
physical entity is an observer-independent, intrinsic attribute to the entity under consideration, whereas the relational
character of certain properties emerges as a consequence of the specificities of the observational protocols that are
used to observe them.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this article we have analyzed how indeterminism intervenes in some of our observational processes, as an integral
part of them. We will not recapitulate in this last section our findings, but offer instead a conclusive thought about
the relation of our analysis with the old debate about free choice.
First of all, we observe that the concept of free choice and the one of free will, although usually confused, are
not the same. Free will, as its name indicates, mostly refers to the hypothetical ability of humans (and possibly
of some animals) to produce a “volitional causation,” that would not be explainable in terms only of deterministic
physical laws. The existence of a genuine human free will, understood in this sense, is therefore beyond the scope of
physics, as usually understood, and the description of its effects in the physical world would in fact constitute a sort
of extra-physical addition to the presently known physical laws.
This is the reason why, although people usually believe in the existence of a genuine volitional causation, as they
subjectively experience it, because of the metaphysical implications of such a notion many scientists consider it to be
a mere illusion, according to the view that all physical entities, humans or not humans, would necessarily be subjected
to deterministic (physical) laws.
But apart from the metaphysical problem of a human free will independent of physical deterministic causation,
there is the simpler question of free choice. As its name indicates, free choice is not about “will,” but about “choice,”
and choice, in turn, refers to the existence of possibilities. If there is only a single possibility in a process, then there
is no choice, but if more possibilities are present, then there is real choice. However, if the mechanism selecting a
possibility is in principle predictable by the one who selects it, obviously there would only be illusion of possibilities,
and therefore only illusion of choice.
Now, as we emphasized in the final paragraph of Sec. VII, there is no incompatibility between the existence of
deterministic laws governing our reality and the emergence of a genuine form of indeterminism in our observations.
When we consider our world in global terms, as a sort of “block entity,” we can certainly affirm that, in a sense,
everything is as it should be, according to the deterministic laws operating at all levels of reality. But a global view
is different from a local one, where the term “local” is here not to be understood only in the reduced sense of spatial
locality.
Indeed, we can easily consider that choice would be non-existent at the global level, but nevertheless truly existent
at a local one, in our reality. This because when we ask an operational question, and associate to it (consciously or
unconsciously) a practical procedure to obtain an answer, then according to the specificities of the procedure (that
could also be intrapsychic) we may not be in a position to predict such answer in advance, not even in principle. And
if the answer is what determines our choice, in a given circumstance, then being our choice truly unpredictable, in
that sense (but only in that sense) it can be considered a non-illusionary free choice.
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